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Abstract 
The recent spate of theoretical models of behaviour under ambiguity can be partitioned into two 
sets: those involving multiple priors (in which the probabilities of the various events are not known 
but probabilities can be attached to the various possible values for the probabilities) and those not 
involving multiple priors. This paper concentrates on the first set and provides an experimental 
investigation into recently proposed theories. Using an appropriate experimental interface, in which 
the  probabilities  on  the  various  possibilities  are  explicitly  stated,  we  examine  the  fitted  and 
predictive power of the various theories. We first estimate subject-by-subject, and then we estimate 
and predict using a mixture model over the contending theories. The individual estimates suggest 
that 24% of our 149 subjects have behaviour consistent with Expected Utility, 56% with the Smooth 
Model (of Klibanoff et al, 2005), 11% with Rank Dependent Expected Utility and 9% with the Alpha 
Model (of Ghirardato et al 2004); these figures are close to the mixing proportions obtained from 
the mixture estimates.  If we classify our subjects through the posterior probabilities (given all the 
evidence) of each of them being of the various types: using the estimates we get 25%, 50%, 20% and 
5% (for EU, Smooth, Rank Dependent and Alpha); while using the predictions 22%, 53%, 22% and 
3%. Interestingly the Smooth model seems to fare the best. 
JEL numbers: D81, C91, C23 
Keywords:  Alpha Model, Ambiguity, Expected Utility, Mixture Models, Rank Dependent Expected 
Utility, Smooth Model.  
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1.  Introduction 
Ambiguity differs from risk in that, under ambiguity, events are not certain but probabilities are not 
known. Decision-making under ambiguity is, in principle therefore, different from decision-making 
under risk. Over the past few years, and intensively so recently, theorists have proposed many new 
theories of behaviour under ambiguity. The purpose of this paper is to report on the empirical 
adequacy of a subset of these new theories. The subset that we concentrate on here arises naturally 
because  of  a  partition  of  the  literature.  Part  of  the  literature  envisages  the  decision-maker  as 
realising that he or she does not know the values of the relevant probabilities (even when they 
exist), or is not prepared to make subjective judgements about the possible probabilities; while 
another  part  envisages  the  decision-maker  as  being  able  to  list  the various possibilities  for  the 
various probabilities and, moreover, as being able to attach probabilities to the various possibilities. 
If you like, it is second-order probabilities, or probabilities of probabilities. It is this second subset 
that we investigate here
1. 
We compare the comparative empirical performan ce of four theories of decision -making 
under ambiguity which use a multiple prior approach. In order to provide a fair evaluation of these 
theories, we use an experimental interface which reproduces exactly a situation of 'probabilities of 
probabilities'.  Moreover, in order to avoid identification issues concerning the correct estimation of 
an underlying utility function (all four theories embody such a function), our experimental design 
involves just two final outcomes for the subject; we normalise on these two and  hence do not need 
any functional form for the utility function. Subjects in the experiment were given a show -up fee of 
€7.50 and could add to that another €40 if the ambiguity resolved itself in their favour. 
Subjects were presented with a total of 49 tasks. Each task started off with a choice between 
two two-stage lotteries. Each two-stage lottery consisted of a set of one-stage lotteries. A one-stage 
lottery was composed of a known number of red balls and a known number of blue balls. At the end 
of the experiment a one-stage lottery was played out: this was done by picking one of the balls at 
                                                           
1  We  should  note  that  we  share  the  doubts  of  those  who  wonder  whether  this  is  the  appropriate 
characterisation of a situation of ambiguity – though, at the end of the day, this is an empirical issue. 3 
 
random and determining the colour of the drawn ball. Depending on which colour the subject had 
designated earlier as their 'winning colour', they either got €40 in addition to their show-up fee or 
nothing.  In  each  of  the  49  tasks,  one  of  the  two  two-stage  lotteries  was  designated  by  the 
experimenter the “unchanging lottery” and the other the “changing lottery”. After indicating which 
they  preferred,  one  of the  one-stage  lotteries  in  the  changing  two-stage  lottery was chosen  at 
random and removed from the two-stage lottery; subjects were then asked to choose again, and this 
procedure continued until the changing two-stage lottery was reduced to a one-stage lottery. After 
all 49 tasks were completed, one of them was chosen at random; one of the stages in playing out 
that task was chosen at random; the subject's choice recovered from the computer; and the chosen 
two-stage lottery was played out in the obvious fashion; resulting in a payment of €40 or of nothing 
to the subject. 
The experimental procedure made clear that the winning colour is subject to a second-order 
probability. Thus we have a direct test of the various theories. We give details of the theories that 
we are investigating in the next section, restricted to the relevant situation in which the final payoff 
is one of two possibilities. We then give more detail of the experimental procedure in the following 
section, and we then present our econometric results, first estimating on a subject-by-subject basis 
before estimating and predicting using a mixture model. We then conclude. 
 
1.  Theories under investigation   
We consider those theories for which we can explicitly derive a preference functional in our 
experimental context. Remember that the context is that of probabilities of probabilities. Clearly 
Expected Utility theory is one of these. We consider also the Smooth Model of Klibanoff et al (2005), 
the well-known Rank Dependent Expected Utility model, and the Alpha Model of Ghirardato et al 
(2004), which is a generalisation of the Maximin Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989). Before we can specify these models, we need to describe the context of our experiment and 
introduce some notation. 4 
 
  As we have already noted, our experimental set up was such that the final payoff (over and 
above the show-up fee) was either €40 or nothing. We normalise the utility function (present in all 
theories) on these two values and hence put u(€40)=1 and u(€0)=0. All the theories we investigate 
envisage the choice between any two lotteries as being dependent on the difference between the 
evaluations of the two lotteries. We ignore for the time being the issue of error. We now specify the 
evaluations of an arbitrary two-stage lottery under each of the theories we are examining. 
  We start with some notational definitions, first defining a generic one-stage lottery of the 
type used in the experiment, and which we denote by O(m,M). This has M balls inside it, of which m 
(0≤m≤M) are of the 'winning colour' (as chosen by the subject), and M-m of the other (non-winning) 
colour. Each of these M balls is equally likely to be drawn if this one-stage lottery is to be played out, 
so that the probability of drawing a winning ball out of the one stage lottery O(m,M) is m/M. 
  We now define a generic two-stage lottery of the type used in the experiment, and which 
we denote by T(m₁,m₂,...,mN;M), where the mn are distinct integers. We write this in such a way that 
m₁<m₂<...<mN. This consists of N one-stage lotteries, each of which has M balls in them. The n'th of 
these  has  mn  winning  balls  and  M-mn  non-winning  balls  in  it.  So  the  generic  two-stage  lottery 
consists of N one-stage lotteries as follows: O(m₁,M), O(m₂,M),..., O(mN,M). Each of these N one-
stage lotteries is equally likely to be drawn if this two-stage lottery is to be played out, so that the 
probability of drawing the one-stage lottery O(mn,M) is 1/N. As we have already noted, if O(mn,M) is 
the one-stage lottery drawn, then the probability of drawing a winning ball from that is mn/M.  
  We can now explain how each of the theories we are considering evaluates the generic one-
stage and the generic two-stage lotteries. Let VPF[O(m,M)] and VPF*T(m₁,m₂,...,mN;M)] denote these 
valuations respectively for preference functional PF. 
 
2.1  Expected Utility Theory (EU) 5 
 
Since there are m winning balls, each of which leads to utility 1, and (M-m) non-winning balls, each 
of which leads to utility 0, and all balls are equally likely to be drawn, the expected utility of the 
generic one-stage lottery is simply given by 
(1)  [ ( , )] EU
m
V O m M
M
     
Since EU is linear in the probabilities, and each of the N one-stage lotteries by which it is formed are 
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2.2  Smooth Model (SM) 
This  model,  proposed  by  Klibanoff  et  al  (2005),  is  quintessentially  a  multiple  prior  model
2. We 
describe its application in the context of the experiment that we have conducted. Essentially, in 
evaluating any two-stage lottery, this model proceeds by taking the Expected Value (with respect to 
the lotteries composing a two-stage lottery) of some function of the Expected Utility of each of the 
one-stage lotteries from which the two -stage lottery is composed. Denoting this function by  ϕ(.) 
and noting that the one-stage lottery O(mn,M) has expected utility mn/M (as in the above) and hence 
has the same value as in EU, it follows that the valuation by the Smooth Model of the generic two-
stage lottery is given by 
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However,  we  prefer  a  specification  for  which  a  particular  parameter  value  reduces  the  Smooth  
                                                           
2 In the general form of the theory, the decision-makers themselves are supposed to specify the set of possible 
probabilities and the probabilities attached to them; in our experiment these were objectively specified and 
we assume that the subjective set and the subjective probabilities are the same as the objective ones. 6 
 
model to EU; this is the case when ϕ(x) = x for all x. So one way of characterising the ϕ(.) function is 
to put 
















Note that when s→0 the Smooth Model reduces to EU. We need to estimate the parameter s. 
 
2.3  Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RD) 
This model was originally introduced by Quiggin (1982) and called by him Anticipated Utility. Since 
then it has been further developed by Segal (1987) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and has now 
become more commonly known as Rank Dependent Expected Utility theory, or, equivalently in our 
context
3, as Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). It values a one-stage lottery 
differently  from Expected Utility theory since probabilities are transformed. Let  f(.)  denote  the 
transformation function, where f(0)=0, f(1)=1 and f is non-decreasing everywhere. Then the generic 
one-stage lottery is valued as 
(5)    [ ( , )] ( ) RD
m
V O m M f
M
  
In  evaluating  the  generic  two-stage  lottery,  since  the  one-stage  lotteries  within  it  are  naturally 
ranked in order by our notation (note that m₁<m₂<...<mN) it follows that its valuation
4 is 
(6)                               
  
     
     
        
   
      
     
We need to specify the function f(.). We follow
5 the suggestion of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and 
use a form which allows for realistic shapes of the function: 
(7)     
1/ ()









We need to estimate the parameter g. When it takes the value 1, RD reduces to EU. 
 
                                                           
3 Because with just two outcomes, the notion of a reference point is irrelevant. 
4 Here the usual convention that f(x)=0 if x<0 never applies. 
5 We also tried the power form f(p) = p
g but this did not appear to represent an improvement. 7 
 
1.4  Alpha Model (AM) 
Ghirardato et al (2004) proposed a generalisation of the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) Maximin 
Expected Utility model. Here there is no use made of the probabilities attached to the members of 
the set of possible distributions, though use is made of knowledge of the best and worst members of 
this set. So this is a multiple prior model, but not one that makes use of actual values of the second-
order probabilities. The model's valuation of a one-stage lottery is exactly as in EU. The worst of the 
one-stage lotteries within the generic two-stage lottery, in our notation, is O(m₁,M), and the best is 
O(mN,M). The Alpha model values the generic second-order lottery as a weighted average of the 
value of the worst and the value of the best one-stage lotteries within the two-stage lottery. Hence 
we have: 
(8)     
1
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    
We note a special case: when a=1 this reduces to Gilboa and Schmeidler's Maximim model (Gilboa 
and Schmeidler 1989). 
 
2.  Our Experimental Implementation 
We  have  already  sketched  the  main  features  of  the  experiment;  we  now  give  detail.  Subjects 
completed the experiment individually at screened and separated computer terminals. During the 
experiment each of the subjects was presented with 49 tasks. Each task started out with two two-
stage lotteries being portrayed on the computer screen, and the subject informed as to which of the 
two was the changing lottery, and hence which was the unchanging lottery. An example of the 
opening screen of a task is given in Figure 1. Each two-stage lottery was composed of a number of 
one-stage lotteries – which are the columns in the two two-stage lotteries in Figure 1. The subject 
was then asked to choose a winning colour (from blue and red) for that task.     
After choosing the winning colour the task started. The following process was followed until 
the changing lottery was reduced to a single one-stage lottery. The subject was asked to select one 8 
 
of the two stage-lotteries as his or her preferred lottery. Then one of the one-stage lotteries from 
the  changing  two-stage  lottery  was  eliminated at  random  –  leaving  a column  gap  in  the visual 
presentation. The subject was again asked to state his or her preferred two-stage lottery. After the 
last choice for a given task (when the changing lottery had been reduced to a single one-stage 
lottery) a new task was presented, until all 49 tasks had been completed. Different subjects got the 
49 tasks in different, randomised, orders. 
The natural incentive mechanism was used. Subjects were told that all their choices on each 
of the pairwise choice problems in each of the 49 tasks would be recorded. Then, at the end of the 
experiment, one of the 49 tasks would be randomly selected, one of the pairwise choice problems 
would be randomly selected, and the subject's preferred choice on that particular problem would be 
played out. To do this, one of the one-stage lotteries (if there were more than one), or the one-stage 
lottery (if there was only one), of the chosen two-stage lottery would be picked at random (with all 
one-stage lotteries within it having the same chance of being picked), and one of the balls in the 
one-stage lottery picked at random. If the colour of the ball picked was the subject's chosen Winning 
Colour on that task, the subject would get paid €40 in addition to the show-up fee. 
  We  should  note  that  the  tasks  used  in  the  experiment  –  their  number  and  the  tasks 
themselves  –  were  selected  after  extensive  pre-experimental  simulations.  We  were  anxious  to 
ensure  that  we  would  have  both  enough  data,  and  enough  informative  data,  to  be  able  to 
distinguish between the different types. Obviously the answer to this question depends upon the 
noise in subjects’ responses, so we first carried out some pilot studies to get some idea as to the 
magnitude of this noise. Equipped with this information, we then simulated a large number of 
experimental questions, selecting those that appeared most discriminatory. The design and results 
of these simulations are available on request. 
  The experiment was conducted in, and financed by, the experimental lab of the Max-Planck 
Institute of Economics, directed by Professor Werner Güth, with subjects recruited using ORSEE 
(Greiner 2004). 9 
 
 
3.  Related Experimental Literature 
We provide here a brief summary of recent experimental work investigating theories of behaviour 
under ambiguity. Earlier literature is surveyed in Camerer and Weber (1992) and Camerer (1995). A 
fuller  survey  can  be  found  in  Hey  and  Pace  (2011),  which  also  gives  more  bibliographical 
information. 
Halevy (2007) marks the start of new experimental work investigating the recent theories; 
subsequent contributions are those of  Anderson et al (2009), Ahn et al (2010), Hey et al (2010), Hey  
and Pace (2011) and Abdellaoui et al (2011). To avoid duplication, we present here only the essential 
features  of  these  experiments,  specifically  the  following:  the  kinds  of  questions  asked  to  the 
subjects: the way that ambiguity was implemented in the laboratory setting: and information about 
the theories (or class of theories) under test. Table 1 gives an overview. 
In these experiments, there were three different types of questions asked to the subjects: 
(1)  reservation  price  questions;  (2)  pairwise  choice  questions;  (3)  allocation  questions.  The 
advantage of the first and last types is that there is more information contained in the answer to 
each question than in the second type; the disadvantage is that it becomes necessary to estimate a 
utility  function.  Because  we  wanted  to  reduce  the  number  of  parameters  that  we  needed  to 
estimate,  we  took  the  decision  not  to  estimate  a  utility  function  and  thus  we  restricted  the 
payments to the subjects to one of two values. This implied immediately that we could not ask 
allocation questions nor ask reservation price questions; and thus were restricted to pairwise choice 
questions. We compensated by having relatively many of them: 49 tasks and 256 pairwise choice 
questions in total; this is many more questions than is usually the case. 
  In  contrast,  the  papers  by  Ahn  et  al  (2010)  and  Hey  and  Pace  (2011)  used  allocation 
questions, in which subjects were asked, in each of a series of questions, to allocate a given sum of 
tokens to various events, with given exchange rates between tokens and money for each of the 
events. If a particular question was selected to determine the payment to the subject, then the 10 
 
question was played out and the resulting event, combined with the allocation that the subject had 
made  to  that  event  and  the  pre-specified  exchange  rate  between  tokens  and  money  for  that 
question  and  that  event,  determined  the  payment  that  the  subject  received  for  his  or  her 
participation (plus any given participation fee). As a result the actual payment might take one of a 
range of values, and hence a utility function over this range would have to be inferred from the 
subject’s answers. This was also the case in the experiments of Halevy (2007) and Abdellaoui et al 
(2011), though both of these papers asked subjects to state certainty equivalents for certain events. 
In the first of these papers, the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) method was used to get subjects to 
state  their  certainty  equivalents;  in  the  second  Holt-Laury  price  lists  were  used.  Both  of  these 
mechanisms have their problems: the BDM, in that appears to be the case that subjects find it 
difficult to understand what the mechanism entails; and the Holt-Laury, in that it appears that the 
answers given by subjects are sensitive to the bounds on the lists. Our method avoids both these 
problems. 
The implementation of ambiguity in the laboratory also varies from paper to paper. Hey et al 
(2010) and Hey and Pace (2011) used a Bingo Blower – in which balls of differing colours (which 
define the events) are blown around inside the Blower in such a way that the balls can be seen but 
not counted. Anderson et al (2009) used a Bingo Cage, which is similar to a Bingo Blower in that the 
balls cannot be counted, but differs from it in that the balls are stationary and not being blown 
about continuously. Anderson et al also used bets on natural events (for example the temperature in 
Paris at a precise time in the future; see Baillon (2008) for more detail). Halevy (2007) used Ellsberg-
type urns, described in much the same way as Ellsberg did: 
“Urn  2:  The  number  of  red  and  black  balls  is  unknown,  it  could  be  any  number 
between 0 red balls (and 10 black balls) to 10 red balls (and 0 black balls)” 
 
as well as urns which would be better described as two-stage lotteries: 
 
“Urn 3: The number of red and black balls is determined as follows: one ticket is 
drawn from a bag containing 11 tickets with the numbers 0 to 10 written on them. 
The number written on the drawn ticket will determine the number of red balls in 
the third urn. For example, if the ticket drawn is 3, then there will be 3 red balls and 
7 black balls.” 11 
 
 
Abdellaoui et al (2011) also used Ellsberg-like urns, but with 8 colours: 
 
“The known urn K contained eight balls of different colours: red, blue, yellow, black, 
green, purple, brown, cyan. The unknown urn contained eight balls with the same 
eight colours, but the composition was unknown in the sense that some colours 
might appear several times and others might be absent.”  
 
This has the same feature as the original unknown Ellsberg urn – subjects were not informed about 
the process of the formation of this urn. It might therefore be the case that they regard this as the 
“suspicious urn. ” 
In  contrast,  and  particularly  because  our  experiment  was  specifically  designed  to  test 
multiple-prior models of ambiguity, we used two-stage lotteries (like Halevy’s Urns 2 and 3). These 
are exactly the type of ambiguity referred to in the theories under test. Moreover, we control the 
probabilities  of  the  various  possibilities,  and  they  are  therefore  immune  to  subjects’  subjective 
interpretation and assessment. 
Partly because of the different types of questions and the different implementations of 
ambiguity,  the  theories  under  test  also  differ  from  paper  to  paper.  But  there  is  a  second  key 
difference between the theories under test. Three of the papers do not investigate specific models 
but rather ‘generic classes’ of models. This is particularly true of Ahn et al (2010) who investigate 
special  cases  of  two  classes:  smooth  and  kinked.  The  kinked  class  essentially  consists  of  those 
theories that are rank dependent in some sense: obviously Choquet EU (see Schmeidler 1989) is in 
this set, as is Rank Dependent EU. There is a kink in the preference function when the ranking of the 
outcomes changes. In contrast there is no kink in the members of the smooth set, because ranking is 
not important. A key member of this latter set is Klibanoff et al‘s Smooth Model. So, in a sense, the 
Ahn  et  al  paper  investigates  two  generic  classes,  though  it  should  be  noted  that  it  does  not 
investigate any specific model in either class.  Anderson et al do a similar investigation of the smooth 
class, while Abdellaoui et al do the same for the kinked class. It follows that none of these theories 
investigate specific theories. This is in contrast to the other papers in the table. 12 
 
  One key remaining difference between these various papers is their objectives. The Hey et al 
and Hey and Pace papers estimate preference functionals and see how well the data fits the various 
theories. So does Anderson et al. In contrast Halevy tests between the various theories. Abdellaoui 
et al, by design, do not compare different theories but instead describe the way that ambiguity and 
risk enter the decision process. While Ahn et al adopt a different methodological approach to that of 
Abdellaoui et al, their interest is similar; they too are interested in how attitude to ambiguity can be 
characterised and how it enters into the decision making process. In contrast, given the recent 
activity of the theorists in producing theories of decision-making under two-stage ambiguity, our 
objective in this paper is to discover which of these is ‘best’ and hence worth pursuing. 
 
4.  Stochastic assumptions 
We  assume  that  decisions  are  made  with  error.  Our  specific  stochastic  assumption  is  that  the 
difference  in  the  value  of  the  objective  function  is  calculated  with  error.  Specifically we  follow 
precedent  and  assume  that,  while  the  decision  on  any  of  the  pairwise  choice  questions  in  the 
experiment should be made on the basis of the difference between V(L) and V(R) (where L and R are 
the two lotteries involved in the decision), it is actually made on the basis of V(L) – V(R) + u where u 
is N(0,σ
2) and is independent across questions. We also add a probabilistic ‘tremble’ (see Moffat and 
Peters 2001) of magnitude  . We estimate the parameters of the various models (s in the Smooth 
Model, g in the Rank Dependent Model and a in the Alpha Model), as well as σ and ω. 
 
5.  Econometric procedures 
We have four models: Expected Utility (EU), the Smooth Model (SM), the Rank Dependent model 
(RD) and the Alpha Model (AM). Our goal is to try and assign subjects to models/types – to see if, 
and which of, these models describe the behaviour of our subjects. We start by fitting the various 
models subject-by-subject. We then use a mixture model, pooling the data from all our 149 subjects, 
and employ the Wilcoxian estimation/prediction methodology: using  just over half our data for 13 
 
estimation, and the remaining data for prediction – hence assessing the relative predictive ability of 
the theories. We provide details in the next two sub-sections.  
 
6.1  Estimation subject-by-subject and model-by-model 
We have a total of 149 subjects. Each of them completed 49 tasks, composed of a grand total of 256 
pairwise choice questions. We summarise the subject-by-subject results in Table 2. In this table we 
assign subjects to a particular type according to pair-wise model testing: likelihood-ratio tests for 
nested pairs (EU v SM and EU v RD) and BIC tests for non-nested pairs (EU v AM, SM v RD, SM v AM, 
RD v AM).   
We see that, using this method to classify subjects to models/types we assign 24% to EU, 
56% to SM, 11% to RD and 9% to AM. We note that this assignment of subjects to type is not very 
different  from  the  assignment  we  obtain  from  the  mixture  estimates  as  we  shall  see  later: 
respectively 26%, 49%, 20% and 5% (see Table 3). 
Figure 2 displays histograms of parameter estimates. The panes on the left show histograms 
of parameter estimates over all subjects in the sample. The panes on the right contain histograms of 
parameter estimates only from subjects who are classified as being of the type, h, with h(SM, RD, 
AM), that is indicated in the corresponding row (see also Table 2). It may be of interest to recall that 
SM reduces to EU when the parameter s takes the value 0; while RD reduces to EU when g takes the 
value 1. 
 
6.2  Mixture Estimation 
The individual estimates reported above are very extravagant in terms of numbers of parameters. 
Moreover,  this  subject-by-subject  approach  ignores  any  smoothness  in  the  distribution  of 
parameters  that  exists  in  the  population  from  which  this  sample  was  drawn.  To  avoid  this 
extravagance, and provide a more parsimonious specification, we now introduce a mixture model. In 14 
 
this context, a mixture model
6 assumes that a certain proportion of the population from which  the 
subject pool was drawn is of each of the four types under consideration (EU, SM, RD and AM): these 
proportions in the population are termed the  mixing proportions; further, and this is the way a 
mixture  model  reduces  the  extravagance,  within  each  type  the  approach  assumes  that  each 
parameter  specified  in  that  particular  type  has  a  distribution  over  the  population.  Estimation 
involves  pooling  the  data  over  all  subjects  and  estimating  the  mixing  proportions  and  the 
parameters of the distributions (over the population) of the parameters of the various models. So, 
for example, instead of having 149 different estimates of the smooth parameter (one for each 
subject) this mixture estimation provides just two: the mean and the variance of the distribution of 
the smooth parameter over the population. The same is true for all the other parameters. The 
histograms in Figure 2 are effectively replaced by the distributions in Figure 3. Instead of getting a 
picture  of  149  separate  individuals,  we  are  getting  a  picture  of  the  set  of  individuals  in  the 
population from which these 149 individuals were drawn. Our results are more generalisable, and 
enable us to make predictions on samples different from the one used in this paper, while individual-
by-individual analysis does not. 
So we use a mixture model. We add an additional methodological component:  we follow 
the  Wilcoxian  estimation-then-prediction  approach  (Wilcox  2007)  to  assess  the  comparative 
empirical plausibility of the various models. Basically this approach involves splitting the data up into 
two parts, one used for estimation and the other (using the resulting estimates) for prediction. He 
advocates this approach because of the greater challenge of the test of good prediction.  
Wilcox (2007) advocates this approach not in a mixture model context but in an individual 
context. In this individual context the approach requires that data are estimated subject-by-subject 
and model-by-model on part of the data, and that the identification of a subject’s type is based on 
the predictive performance of each model on the remaining data. We have to modify appropriately 
his approach in a mixture model context. As we have already noted the mixture model approach 
                                                           
6 For further details on the mixture approach in the context of choice under risk, see Conte et al. (2011).   15 
 
pools data over subjects and hence deals with subjects’ heterogeneity in two ways: it allows subjects 
to be of different types; and to differ in terms of the parameters for the functional that they have. 
The former point is taken care of by assuming that each subject is of one type, and that he or she 
does  not  change  type  throughout  the  experiment,  and  by  estimating  the  proportion  of  the 
population who are of each type. The latter is dealt with by assuming a distribution of the relevant 
parameters over the population and by estimating the parameters of that distribution.  
The reason we decided to combine the two approaches is twofold. We find the Wilcoxian 
approach  extremely  elegant  and  powerful,  but  we  realised  that  it  does  not  work  well  on  an 
individual basis with our data in the context of our experiment. Suppose, for example, that a subject 
behaves exactly as EU without any mistake but one, and that the wrong choice is included in the 
sample of choices  used for prediction. From the sample used for estimation, we  infer that our 
subject is EU with an error term with zero variance. When we try to calculate the likelihood of the 
prediction, the only mistaken choice results in a log-likelihood of -. Consequently, we might be 
induced to reject the hypothesis for that subject of being EU in favour of another model, when that 
subject is in fact EU. The mixture approach assumes that the parameters of the relevant models 
follow a certain distribution but, at the same time, provides consistent estimates of the proportion 
of the population who are of each type. In a particular sense, it introduces a parameter smoothness 
assumption, but uses information about the population (mixing proportions and distribution of the 
relevant parameters for the functionals included in the mixture) in assigning subjects to types.  
In order to implement our approach, we split our observations into two samples: (1) an 
estimation  sample,    ,  that  includes  the  observations  from  25  tasks  (selected  at  random), 
corresponding  to  132  binary  choices,    and  we  use  these  to  estimate  the  mixture  model;  (2)  a 
prediction sample,   , that includes the remainder 24 tasks, corresponding to 124 binary choices, 
and we use these to make predictions. More precisely, we proceed as follows: we use the estimation 
sample  to  estimate  the  mixture  model;  we  calculate  the  likelihood  of  the  prediction  from  the 
prediction sample using the parameter estimates obtained in the first step. We finally compute by 16 
 
Bayes’ rule the posterior probability for each subject of being of each type from the likelihood of the 
prediction  and  assign  subjects  to  types  according  to  the  highest  posterior  probability  of  the 
prediction. 
As we have already noted, we start by assuming that a proportion    of the population from 
which  the  experimental  sample  is  drawn  is  of  type    ,  with        ,               and 
                 .  These  mixing  proportions    ,  with                   ,  are  estimated 
along with the other parameters of the mixture model. The likelihood contribution of subject i is 
(10)                        
 
 
                , 
where    
 
  is the penalised likelihood contribution of individual i under the hypothesis of her being of 
type  k,  with                   .  We  will  define  what  we  mean  by  a  “penalised”  likelihood 
contribution after having specified the likelihood contribution of each type. For this purpose, let us 
use the binary variable     that takes the value 1 if subject i chooses the left-hand lottery in problem 
t,  it  takes  the  value  -1  if  subject  i  chooses  the  right-hand  lottery  in  problem  t.  The  likelihood 
contribution for subject i’s choice in problem t, given that subject i is of type EU, is 
(11)      
                      
             
   
   
 
                      . 
Here,      is the unit normal cumulative distribution function;     is the standard deviation of the 
Fechner error term for the EU model; and   is a tremble probability (the probability that the subject 
chooses at random between the two lotteries). The likelihood contribution for subject i’s choice in 
problem t, given that subject i is of type               , is 
(12)       
                       
           
  
   
 
       
 
                       . 
Here,      is the density of the parameter  . In the case       ,   represents the parameter s, with 
         ,          and        .  In  the  case
7        ,     represents  the  parameter   ,  with 
                        ,              and       . In the case
8       ,   represents the 
                                                           
7 In this case the parameter g has to be bounded below to make the function f(.) monotonically increasing over 
[0,1]. 
8 In this case the parameter a has to be between 0 and 1. 17 
 
parameter  , with            ,       and      .    are the standard deviations of the Fechner 
error term attached to each model in  .    and   are the same as defined for type EU. We assume 
that   is independent of type because there is no reason to assume that any type should tremble 
more than another. The sum over all i in the sample for        of the logarithm of (10) is maximised 
by maximum simulated likelihood; the integrations in (12) are performed by four sets of Halton 
sequences. 
Likelihood contributions are penalised depending upon the number of observations used in 
the estimation and the number of free parameters estimated.
9 Thus, the relationship between    
  
and    
 
  is 
(13)               
 






                        
Here,          is the number of choices per individual in the estimation sample.   is the number of 
free parameters estimated. We have that   equals one for type EU and three for types SM, RD and 
AM. The penalisation of the likelihood contributions used here corresponds to the Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). 
Table 3 reports parameter estimates of the mixture model derived above. The estimates of 
the mixing proportions suggest that 26% of the population is EU, 49% is SM, 20% is RD and 5% is AM. 
Figure 3 shows density plots of the mixture model parameters according to the estimated results in 
Table 3. We note, in passing, that these mixing proportions are close to the proportions assigned to 
types  that  we  obtained  from  the  individual  estimates,  and  are  also  close  to  the  posterior 
probabilities that we will present later in Table 4.  
 
6.2.1 Prediction results 
Now  that  we  have  obtained  the  estimation  results  reported  in  Table  3,  we  can  proceed  with 
calculating the likelihoods of the choice prediction using equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) but 
                                                           
9 See, for example, Preminger and Wettstein (2005). 18 
 
where we replace parameters to be estimated with parameter estimates, which are assembled in 
the  vector                                                                               .  Tasks  and  choices  are  those 
contained in the prediction sample,                . In equations (13)         . Using Bayes' rule we 
compute the posterior probabilities of types for each i in our sample as follows: 
(14)                                                           
                                            
                   
 
        
 
                  
                                               . 
Basically, we re-calculate equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) by replacing parameters with parameter 
estimates, and, for each subject, by replacing tasks and choices from the estimation sample with 
tasks and choices from the prediction sample.
10 We can also calculate the posterior probabilities 
based on the estimation sample; these are given by equation (14) with    replaced by   ; of course 
here  we use  the maximised likelihood over the estimation sample. We can use these posterior 
probabilities on both the estimates and the predictions to assign subjects to types, though, following 
Wilcox (2007) we prefer assignment on the predictions. Interestingly, however, in this context the 
proportions assigned to types are not very different whether we use estimates or predictions (see 
Table 4 which we will explain shortly). First, however, we explain the assignation with the help of 
Figure 4. 
Figure  4  displays  six  simplexes  summarising  the  results  from  analysing  the  posterior 
probabilities; the first row of three simplexes refers to the estimation sample, and the second row to 
the prediction sample. This figure is crucial as it shows very clearly the power of our experiment in 
classifying the subjects by type. Each simplex represents the posterior probabilities of types for each 
subject in our sample computed following the procedure explained above. Subjects are points in the 
simplexes: the closer a subject is to the vertex of a simplex, the higher the posterior probability for 
that subject of the type represented on that vertex. The smallest circles represent single subjects, 
larger circles represent concentration of subjects in that area of the simplex: the larger the circle, the 
                                                           
10 Obviously, we do not maximise the resulting likelihood at this stage, because we use parameter estimates. 19 
 
higher the number of subjects represented by that circle. Since we realised that for all subjects in 
our sample no more than three posterior probabilities at a time were larger than .005, we grouped 
subjects in three simplexes that display on each vertex the three types for which the posterior 
probabilities are larger than .005. The simplexes in the first (estimation) row involve 61, 44 and 44 
subjects respectively; those in the second (prediction) row 72, 31 and 46 respectively. We see that 
most of the subjects are concentrated at the vertices of the simplexes, showing that our mixture 
assigns them to type with very high posterior probability. This is a really crucial finding: it implies 
that, except for a handful of subjects for whom there is some confusion as to their type, the vast 
majority of the subjects can very clearly be assigned to a specific type. 
This statement is confirmed by Figure 5 (which shows the cumulative percentage of subjects 
assigned to a type with maximum posterior probability less than the probability indicated on the 
horizontal axis) both for the estimates (the black step function) and the predictions (the grey step 
function). It shows that the predictive power of our mixture model is quite impressive: all subjects 
are assigned to a type with posterior probability larger than .5; more than 95% of subjects are 
assigned to a type with posterior probability .75 or more; almost 90% of subjects in our sample are 
assigned to a type with posterior probability .90 or more. The prediction is slightly less impressive (as 
the step function is above that for the estimations) but only marginally so. 
Table 4 presents the results of assignment to types according to the posterior probabilities 
of the estimates (the final column) and of the predictions (the bottom row); it also presents a cross-
tabulation  (in  the  cells  of  the  matrix).  Using  the  posterior  probabilities  from  the  estimates 
(predictions) 25% (22%) are assigned to EU, 50% (53%) to SM, 20% (22%) to RD and 5% (3%) to AM.  
The bulk of the subjects appear down the main diagonal in Table 4 (indicating the same assignment 
on  both  the  estimation  and  the  prediction)  though  26.8%  are  classified  differently  on  the  two 
methods. This ‘instability’ is a feature pointed out by Wilcox (2007) as inevitable unless one has a lot 
of data: in our case it would seem that 49 tasks or 256 observations are not enough for some 
subjects and that these subjects are simply unstable and do not have a fixed preference function. In 20 
 
conclusion it would appear to be the case that we can assign virtually all subjects to a type with very 
high probability.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
We have examined the empirical plausibility (both in estimation and prediction) of four multiple 
prior models of choice under ambiguity (these being an important subset of all models of behaviour 
under ambiguity). We carried out an appropriate experiment on 149 subjects, involving 49 tasks and 
256 pairwise decision problems, and used the resulting data to assign subjects to models/types. We 
started with estimation subject-by-subject, and then we turned to a mixture model, pooling all our 
149 subjects together. The mixture model enables us to classify subjects to models with a high 
degree of accuracy, with posterior probabilities of subjects being of one type or another being over 
0.90 for around 90% of our subjects. These posterior probabilities suggest that around 22% of our 
subjects follow Expected Utility (EU) theory, 53% the Smooth Model (SM) of Klibanoff et al, some 
22% the Rank Dependent (RD) model and around 3% the Alpha Model (AM) of Ghirardato et al. 
Interestingly the assignments based on the estimated data do not differ very much from those based 
on prediction data – unlike in Wilcox (2007).  
In a sense the poor showing of the Alpha model is not surprising as the model does not use all 
the information given to the subjects; indeed one might not even call it a genuine multiple prior 
model. Both EU and RD appear to perform equally well. However, the clear ‘winner’ in terms of the 
number of subjects with that preference functional is the Smooth model – suggesting that over 50% 
of subjects do not reduce two-stage gambles to their one-stage equivalents analysing the decision 
problems: they do indeed view two-stage trees as different from the reduced one-stage trees. 
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Table 1: Recent related experimental work 
Paper             Type  of  questions
   
Implementation  of 
ambiguity   
Theories being investigated 
Halevy (2007)  Certainty 
equivalents/Reservati
on prices (using BDM 
Mechanism) 




Anderson  et  al 
(2009) 
Pairwise Choices  Bingo cage and real 
events 
Minimalist  non-EU  model  (a 
special case of Smooth
d 
Ahn et al (2010)   Allocations  Probabilities of two 
of  the  three  states 
not stated 
Two  broad  classes:  smooth  and 
kinked;  special  cases  of  more 
general models 
Hey,  Lotito  and 
Maffioletti 
(2010) 
Pairwise choices  Bingo Blower  EV,  SEU,  Choquet,  Prospect, 
Cumulative  Prospect,  Decision 
Field  Theory,  Alpha
b  plus  some 
older theories 
Hey  and  Pace 
(2011) 
Allocations  Bingo Blower  SEU, Choquet, Alpha




Abdellaoui et al 
(2011)   
Certainty 
equivalents/Reservati
on prices (using Holt-
Laury price lists) 
8-colour  Ellsberg 
type urns 
RDEU 
Conte  and  Hey 
(2011)
f 





aReferred to as Recursive Nonexpected Utility; 
bGhirardato et al (2004) (Including the special 
cases Maxmin and Maxmax); 
cIt is not clear to me what weighting function (Quiggin or Power) is 
used; 
dKlibanoff et al (2005); 
eGajdos et al (2008); 
fthis paper. 
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Table 2: Individual by individual analysis 
Subjects are assigned to types by likelihood-ratio and BIC tests 
type  Freq.  % 
EU  36   24.16 
SM  83   55.70 
RD  17   11.41 
AM  13     8.72 
Total  149  100.00 
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Table 3: Estimates results of mixture model (10). 
type  parameters  mixing proportions 
EU      
         
                
        
           
    
       
               
SM    
        
                
       
          
      
        
               
    
         
               
RD    
        
               
        
           
      
        
               
    
        
               
AM    
        
                
        
           
      
       
               
            
        
           
Log-likelihood                  
number of observations              
number of subjects       149 
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Table 4: Cross tabulation of subjects assigned to types 
according to highest posterior probabilities of the 
estimate (rows) and subjects assigned to types according 
to the highest posterior probability of the prediction 
(columns.) 




































  EU  SM  RD  AM  total 
EU  25  11  0  2  38 
SM  5  59  8  2  74 
RD  0  6  24  0  30 
AM  3  3  0  1  7 
total  33  79  32  5  149 
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Figure 1: The experimental interface 
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Figure 2: Histograms of parameter estimates obtained by individual by individual and model 
by model analysis of the data. 
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Figure 3: Density plots of the relevant parameters of the functional in mixture model (10) from parameter 
estimates in Table 3. 
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Figure 4: Posterior probabilities distributions of the 4 types. In each simplex, the posterior probability of the missing 
type is < .005. For the estimation sample, the three graphs (left to right) involve 61, 44 and 44 subjects, 
respectively. For the prediction sample, 72, 31 and 46, respectively.  To produce the graphs, posterior probabilities 






































     
 















Figure 5: Cumulative percentage of subjects assigned to a type 
with maximum posterior probability < posterior probability 
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